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Resumen
Cuesta imaginar un texto más serio que Tratado 
para Radicales: Un Manual para Radicales 
Realistas de Saul Alinsky (1971). Es lo que el 
título dice, un conjunto de directrices para aquellos 
que aspiran a convertirse en los organizadores del 
cambio social – revolucionarios de alguna clase, de 
la clase realista. Las directrices son ‘pragmáticas’ 
en su sentido cotidiano y, por lo tanto, totalmente 
práctico. Aún así, el humor se introduce en él. Este 
trabajo explora una de las historias educativas de 
Alinsky que, sin tener un propósito humorístico, 
tiene, sin embargo, el potencial de conseguir efectos 
humorísticos. El análisis de este ejemplo servirá 
para hacer referencia a la relación entre humor 
y seriedad. Asimismo, ilustra cómo la atención 
sistemática a la calibración de la generación de 
los niveles del significado explícito e implícito se 
puede usar en la investigación del humor. Se harán 
algunas observaciones adicionales sobre cómo este 
ejemplo se relaciona con algunas de las nociones 
básicas en las teorías del humor.
PALABRAS CLAVE: humor, seriedad, 
narrativa, explicidad/ implicidad, pragmática.
Abstract
It is hard to imagine a text more serious than 
Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic 
Primer for Realistic Radicals (1971). It 
is what its title says, a set of guidelines for 
those aspiring to become organizers of societal 
change – revolutionaries of some kind, the 
‘realistic’ kind. The guidelines are ‘pragmatic’ 
in its everyday sense, hence entirely down-
to-earth. Yet, humor comes in. This paper 
explores one of Alinsky’s educational stories 
which clearly lacks overall humorous intent 
but still has the potential of scoring humorous 
effects. An analysis of the example is used to 
address the relationship between humor and 
seriousness. At the same time it illustrates how 
systematic attention to the calibration of explicit 
and implicit levels of meaning generation can 
be used in the investigation of humor. Some 
additional remarks are made about how the 
example relates to some of the common notions 
in theories of humor.
KEYWORDS: Humor, Seriousness, Narrative, 
Explicitness/Implicitness, Pragmatics.
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Resumen
El trabajo analiza la potencialidad del territorio para la implantación de parques eólicos en la Comu-
nidad Autónoma de Andalucía. Para ello se construye un modelo locacional utilizando las capacidades 
analíticas de los Sistemas de Información Geográfica (SIG) y las Técnicas de Evaluación Multicriterio 
(EMC). En est  modelo se señalarán as zonas con mayor potencialidad para la implantación eólica, así 
como aquéllas en las que ésta re ulta desaco sejable o incluso incompatibl  con otras actividades y usos 
del territorio. Los resultados ponen en evidencia la existencia de diversas limitaciones en Andalucía para 
el desarrollo de la energía eólica, pero, además y sobre todo, pueden ofrecer un instrumento de gran uti-
lidad para un impulso ordenado del sector eólico en la región.
Palabras clave: Energía eólica; Territorio; Técnicas de Evaluación Multicriterio; Sistemas de Informa-
ción Geográfica; Andalucía.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the potential of the land to set up wind farms in Andalusia (Sout ern Spain). A 
locational model using the analytical capabilities of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Multi-cri-
teria Evaluation Techniques (EMC) has been built. This will be able to point out the areas with the grea-
test potential for wind power, as well as those in which it is inadvisable or even incompatible with other 
activities and land use. The results highlight the existence of several constraints in Andalusia to develop 
wind energy, but also and above all, they provide a useful tool to promote the wind energy industry in the 
region in a  orderly fashion.
Key words: Wind energy; Territory; Multi-criteria analysis; Geographical Information System; Andalusia.
1. Introducción
Con una p blación de 8.401.000 habitantes en 2014 (Sistema de Información Multit rritorial de 
Andalucía, 2015) y una extensión de 87.554 km2, la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía posee un alto 
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1. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS
When reading a recent pragmatics textbook such as Culpeper and Haugh (2014), it is 
striking how many of their examples to illustrate how ordinary language use works, are 
in fact jokes. Similarly, many of the examples to illustrate politeness and impoliteness in 
Kádár and Haugh (2013) are simply funny episodes from movies or television series. These 
observations made me wonder: If humor is so essential for pragmatics and specifically for 
politeness phenomena, did I ever write anything about humor? In my forty years of writing 
about pragmatic issues, the only episode I could find is the following:
Grice’s theory of conversational implicature is predicated on a model of communication 
which attaches the highest normative value to demands for rationality and efficiency. As 
has often been observed in the pragmatic literature, however, social behavior also incor-
porates norms which would seem to require breaches of the maxims. [p. 35] Norms of 
politeness, in particular, often do not allow for fully informative utterances, unmitigated 
truth, or complete clarity (see also 1.2.). It is this intuition that was captured by Dan at a 
pretheoretical level when he made the metapragmatic statement Just trying to be polite 
in (1)8. Similarly, there are types of verbal activity, such as those covered by the label 
humour, which would barely be possible with complete adherence to the maxims (see 
Illustration 2) – though a stretch of discourse which follows the maxims diligently might 
itself turn out to be quite humorous for precisely that reason. Politeness and humor both 
exploit the impossibility of full explicitness strategically, using many of the mechanisms 
described by Grice, to generate implicated meaning. (Verschueren 1999: 35-36)
Not only is this, to the best of my recollection, the only written statement I ever made 
about humor – the same goes for politeness.1 Is it accidental, then, that I put these two 
phenomena, politeness and humor, in one paragraph in the only piece I have ever written 
about them?
Looking at what I say in the above quotation, and comparing it with Culpeper & Haugh, 
for instance, there is a striking similarity. I talk about the exploitation of the impossibility of 
full explicitness. Culpeper & Haugh give the first four examples in their book – all jokes – 
in a section entitled “Beyond the linguistic code”, which is about the relationship between 
coded, and therefore decodable meaning on the one hand, and the extra, implicit meaning 
that is communicated and understood on the other, and they say “[…] we will simultaneously 
explore a number of jokes, not least because jokes often exploit the construction of meaning” 
(Culpeper and Haugh 2014: 2). The examples are the following:
(1) A: Why can’t a man’s head be twelve inches wide?
 B: Er … don’t know.
 A: Because if it was, it would be a foot.
(2) Q: How do you make a cat drink?
 A: Easy, put it in the liquidiser.
1 In Verschueren (1999) there are or course a few more examples that may seem ‘funny’ (notably an airline 
pilot’s probably unintentional humor when apologizing for delays and saying over the intercom “Once we are in 
the air, we’ll fly as fast as possible”, followed by giggles among the passengers), but they were not thematized as 
part of a discussion of humor.
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(3) A man and a friend are playing golf one day. One of the guys is about to chip onto the 
green when he sees a long funeral procession on the road next to the course. He stops in 
mid-swing, takes off his golf cap, closes his eyes, and bows down in prayer. His friend 
says: “Wow! That is the most thoughtful and touching thing I have ever seen. You are truly 
a kind man.”
 The other man replies, “Yeah, well, we were married thirty-five years.”
(4) I was coming back from Canada, driving through Customs, and the guy asked, “Do you 
have any firearms with you?” I said: “What do you need?”
Culpeper and Haugh go on to distinguish different aspects of the ‘construction’ of 
meaning they have in mind. Example (1) is a pun that depends on an assignment of sense 
to a polysemous word. Example (2) hinges on an assignment of structural meaning: the 
question can be parsed differently: drink as main verb of the embedded clause a cat drink 
vs. drink as head noun of a noun phrase pre-modified by cat. Example (3) requires an 
assignment of reference: the interpretation depends on working out the reference of we 
which, in combination with married, refers to a man and his wife, the woman for whom 
the funeral procession is held. Example (4) allows for different assignments of utterance 
meaning, in particular, different assignments of a specific speech act status to Do you have 
any firearms with you?
Culpeper and Haugh’s summary: “Jokes, as we saw, often exploit the fact that meanings 
cannot be straightforwardly decoded from words and structures.” (Culpeper and Haugh 
2014: 5).
So we now have three notions to cope with: humor, politeness/impoliteness, and 
explicitness/implicitness. And two points present themselves for clarification:
(i) These three are not ‘equivalent’: both humor and politeness seem to need reference to 
explicitness/implicitness for their explanation.
(ii) The latter two seem to imply a somewhat bipolar scale. But what about humor then? Does 
it have ‘seriousness’ as it’s opposite?
We will briefly go into (ii) first (in section 2), and then we will return to (i) (in section 
3), i.e. the role of implicitness/explicitness as a conceptual tool to make sense of (ii).
2. HUMOR AND SERIOUSNESS
At first sight, seriousness would seem to be the opposite of humor, just like impoliteness 
is the opposite of politeness and implicitness is the opposite of explicitness – at least in 
everyday senses of the terms. One might object that unlike seriousness, denoting a quality 
or attitude, the term ‘humor’ refers to a form of behavior: a comical or amusing text or 
performance can be categorized as humor. But let’s not forget that while this use of the 
word may be the default in what linguists write about humor, it is only a specialized sense 
deriving from a complex conceptual history (a) starting in medieval physiology where 
humor referred to any of the four body fluids (blood, phlegm, choler, melancholy) and 
their related qualities (hotness, coldness, dryness, moistness), (b) moving on to any mental 
quality, temperament or mood based on the relative proportions of the bodily humors, and 
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(c) ending up with a person’s ability to exhibit or appreciate amusing or comical occurrences 
or behavior. Certainly if we extend humor to one of its manifestations, joking, the objection 
fades away: “I’m serious” can be used on exactly the same occasion as “I’m not joking”, 
which implies a rather clear and straightforward contrast or opposition.
Humor vs. seriousness would also seem to be an equally gradable phenomenon as the 
politeness/impoliteness and the explicitness/implicitness scales. But while the latter are 
commonly treated as scales, with phenomena such as mock impoliteness and teasing (which 
tests the hearer’s capacity to appreciate face-threatening fun at his/her own expense), or forms 
of coded (and hence not entirely implicit) implicitness (such as presuppositions carried by 
specific forms of expression), i.e. phenomena to be found in border areas between the extremes, 
discussions of the humor/seriousness dichotomy show a different pattern. They either involve 
evaluation, as when the question is asked as to what turns parody (defined in terms of relatively 
innocent intent) into insult (defined in terms of uptake/interpretation)2, or they involve a denial 
of the dichotomy, stressing that humor and seriousness go together. Testimony of how humor 
and seriousness go together can be found in the statements of well-known people:
If you can get humor and seriousness at the same time, you’ve created a special little 
thing, and that’s what I’m looking for, because if you get pompous, you lose everything. 
(Paul Simon)
Humor and seriousness are not in opposition to each other. (Al Franken)
Sheer playfulness and deadly seriousness are my closest friends. (Philip Roth)
Or consider NBA-player Shaquille O’Neal’s doctorate on The duality of humor and 
seriousness in leadership styles (and the public appearances in which this duality is 
thematized; cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kf6MQgxFvc). 
Still, while it is possible to talk about aggressive humor or sarcastic humor, you don’t 
hear about serious humor, in spite of the apparent possibility of interconnectedness of 
the two concepts. To explain this, we must keep in mind an ambiguity in the meaning 
of ‘seriousness’. The seriousness referred to in “I’m serious” (used as another way of 
saying “I’m not joking”) bears on the extent to which what is said (propositionally) must 
be taken literally, as a reflection of what the speaker holds as true. On the other hand, the 
seriousness referred to in the statements above pertains to overall communicative intent, a 
message the language user is trying to get across, as opposed to the possible jocularity of 
the style with which this is done.3 The possible interconnectedness or non-contrast, in this 
second sense, is also hinted at in the pragmatic literature, where humor is often studied in 
its capacity of serving specific serious purposes. Consider Pamela Hobbs’ (2007) “Judges’ 
use of humor as a social corrective,” Kazuyo Murata’s (2014) “An empirical cross-cultural 
study of humour in business meetings in New Zealand and Japan,” or Yu Wang’s (2014) 
“Humor in British academic lectures and Chinese students’ perceptions of it,” to name 
just three examples. Court cases, business meetings, and academic lectures are serious 
2 As recent events (as with the Danish Mohammed cartoons) have shown, both sides of the interpretive divide 
usually blame each other: for not appreciating the humor, or for not understanding the seriousness.
3 For a more sophisticated look at how ‘jocularity’ works, see Sinkeviciute (2016).
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stuff, yet humor occupies a place in them and may demonstrably serve the overall serious 
purposes. Conversely, failed humor may become a serious matter, as argued by Bell:
Although scholars recognize the many serious functions of humor, among lay people hu-
mor is generally considered as merely frivolous and fun, and this portrayal is easy to main-
tain when all goes well. However, as with a great deal of linguistic behavior, it is when 
expectations are not met that social norms are revealed. The responses presented here [i.e. 
responses to failed attempts at humor] suggest that, under some conditions, humor is not at 
all frivolous – if this were the case, its failure would be of little consequence and certainly 
not worthy of some of the more vehement responses that were collected. (Bell 2009: 161)
Among the many theories of humor, some focus specifically on why people use humor. 
More often than not, the explanations hinge on a subtle link with serious issues such as conflicts, 
solidarity, and power. Hay (2000) observes a gender difference, men often using humor to 
resolve conflicts, women to show solidarity. Holmes (1998, 2000) studies the workings of 
humor in the workplace, serving either as a subtle challenge to power or to de-emphasize one’s 
own power. And of course there is the well-known relief theory of humor, presenting laughter 
as a basic mechanism to reduce tension. A recent manifestation of this function emerged 
when, after terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels (where plans for the attacks were thought to 
have been made) went into lockdown. Authorities asked the population not to spread around 
pictures of what was happening in the streets, just to make sure that police searches could 
not simply be followed through the social media. Obliging this request, a twitter account 
(#brusselslockdown) was started, spreading around numerous funny cat pictures: 
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Maybe we must conclude that humor is simply central to (verbal) social interaction 
in general. But what about the observed seriousness of humor or the appeal to humor for 
serious causes, which seems to be so pervasive? Surely, this is a type of question that 
does not have a parallel in the politeness/impoliteness sphere. How does this symbiotic 
relationship between apparent opposites work? Theories of how humor works (as opposed 
to theories of why it is used), such as the incongruity-resolution theory, will no doubt come 
in. But what I am interested in is the nuts and bolts of the meaning-generating mechanisms 
involved. In section 3 I will take a few steps in what I hope to be the right direction. But in 
order for this attempt to be successful, I need a good example.
It is hard to imagine a text more serious than Saul Alinsky’s (1971) Rules for Radicals: A 
Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals. The book is what its title says, a set of guidelines 
for those aspiring to become organizers of societal change – revolutionaries of some kind, 
the ‘realistic’ kind. The guidelines are ‘pragmatic’ in its everyday sense, hence entirely 
down-to-earth. Yet, humor comes in. First of all, humor is a tool for conveying serious 
messages; hence, some of the guidelines are themselves phrased in funny ways. Consider 
“A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag” (p. 128). Second, some of the educational 
stories that are told clearly lack humorous intent, and still they have the potential of scoring 
humorous effects. One such story is told when trying to illustrate the need to find common 
experiences as a basis for successful communication. Alinsky reports on a little experiment 
he did to convince his trainees during a workshop for aspiring ‘radicals.’ The reported 
event was his walking around the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles, followed by a few of his 
trainees, and trying to give passers-by a ten-dollar bill. The reactions of those passers-by 
form the content of the story (which is quoted in full below).
3. THE PRAGMATICS OF HUMOR IN A SERIOUS STORY – BACK TO EXPLI-
CITNESS/IMPLICITNESS
My goal is to analyze aspects of the meaning-generating that goes on in Alinsky’s 
story, with a focus on one of the basic pragmatic mechanisms, the calibration of explicit 
and implicit meaning. To that end, I will make use of a descriptive three-dimensional 
matrix that can be handled for talking about implicitness.4 Though there is no space here 
to argue at length for the specific properties of this matrix, I must quickly identify the 
underlying assumptions. The first assumption is that implicitness-explicitness is not a 
dichotomous but a gradable distinction. Not all implicit meaning is equally implicit. Thus 
there is a dimension of ‘salience’, determined by the accessibility and processing costs 
related to specific carriers of implicit meaning. The second is that the gradability is not 
one-dimensional in the sense that specific linguistic phenomena could be nicely located 
along a single implicit-explicit axis. For one thing, there is also the local strategic interplay 
between a carrier of implicit meaning and its linguistic environment and non-linguistic 
context. This means that both the dimensions of ‘structure’ and ‘context’ are involved as 
well, yielding the three-dimensional matrix in Figure 3.
4 I have used the same descriptive technique for other purposes in Verschueren (2016) – which is why the fol-
lowing couple of paragraphs are near-identical to the ones I needed to explain the model in that earlier publication.
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 salience  context
structure
Figure 3. Three dimensions of implicitness.
In principle, these three dimensions (corresponding to three of the four angles from 
which to approach linguistic adaptability phenomena)5 should enable us to plot meaning 
landscapes (reflecting the dynamics involved, i.e., the fourth, most central, angle). In actual 
practice it is much harder, and it is not an understatement to say that at this moment I can 
only do this intuitively. No doubt, ‘salience’ can be measured to a certain extent; for instance, 
significant advances have been made in experimental pragmatics that enable us to distinguish 
between types of generalized conversational implicatures in terms of processing time and 
effort (Doran et al. 2012); but this type of work is available only for a very restricted set of 
phenomena. Probably ‘structure’ is the easiest dimension, as the structural locus of a trigger 
of meaning can be described in terms of well-established linguistic categories. ‘Context’ is a 
bit more complicated again, since the relevant elements are occasion-specifically determined 
by the lines of vision or the points of orientation adopted by the interlocutors.
When representing analyses based on this analytical matrix, a ‘flat’ diagram can be used, 
in which the structural dimension simply follows the sequential linear ordering of structural 
elements, in which such sequentially ordered structural elements are linked with aspects of 
meaning that represent contextual indexing, and in which these two levels (structure and 
context) are separated by different layers standing for degrees of salience (to be identified, 
as said before, in an intuitive manner, but using as a rule of thumb that the more likely an 
element of meaning is to be questioned, the closer it will be to the surface of explicitness). 
See Table 1. Note the terminological jump I make from ‘context’ to ‘contextual indexing.’ In 
fact, context itself must be described in terms of aspects of inferable meaning rather than in 
terms of ‘naked’ aspects of context: what implicitness/explicitness is all about is the variable 
ways in which forms index context (and in which we infer meaning from forms in context).
(sequential) structure
salience
contextual indexing à
Table 1. Representational diagram.
5 Reference is made here to the theoretical framework for a pragmatic theory sketched in Verschueren (1999).
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But let’s get down to work. Following is the story to be analyzed:
I walked around, trying to give the ten-dollar bill away. The reactions were all “within the 
experiences of the people.” About three of them, seeing the ten-dollar bill, spoke first – “I’m 
sorry, I don’t have any change.” Others hurried past saying, “I’m sorry, I don’t have any 
money on me right now,” as though I had been trying to get money from them instead of 
trying to give them money. One young woman flared up, almost screaming, “I’m not that 
kind of a girl and if you don’t get away from here, I’ll call a cop!” Another woman in her 
thirties snarled, “I don’t come that cheap!” There was one man who stopped and said, “What 
kind of a con game is this?” and then walked away. Most of the people responded with 
shock, confusion, and silence, and then quickened their pace and sort of walked around me.
After approximately fourteen people, I found myself back at the front entrance of the 
Biltmore Hotel, still holding my ten-dollar bill. My four companions had, then, a clearer 
understanding of the concept that people react strictly on the basis of their own experience. 
(From: Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, p. 87)
Keeping in mind the entire context (sketched at the end of section 2), this text requires 
at least four levels of pragmatic analysis, indicated with roman I to IV in Table 2. 
7  
  
 
Table 2. Levels of analysis 
Let us look at the four levels of analysis one by one. At each level, there is a lot more to be analyzed, in terms 
of the calibration of explicit and implicit meaning, than what is immediately relevant in this context. Just look at 
sentence 1: I, a case of person deixis, is referentially indeterminate; walked around, a case of spatial deixis, is in 
itself equally indeterminate; trying implies an expectation of difficulty; to give away evokes a transactional frame or 
script involving an actor, an action, an object, and a beneficiary or target; the ten-dollar bill is a definite description 
carrying an existential presupposition, and dollar is underspecified with respect to the type of monetary system. All 
potential uncertainties (i.e. meanings left implicit) are, however, resolved (i.e. potentially brought to the surface of 
interpretational explicitness) for the reader given the available intratextual correspondences. Most of what there is to 
be analyzed at level I (the phrase and sentence level) is of this kind. Choices that are made at that level, however, 
make clear contributions to the effects scored at higher levels of structure. 
Things that are immediately relevant for an understanding of the amusing nature of the story start happening 
at level II, which is the level of six embedded interactions (labelled A to F), which all have as their first pair part the 
‘offer’ described in sentence 1, which is clearly conceived as an attempt to break expectations. In each case, the 
second pair part is linked to the first pair part by means of a form of (sometimes overtly interpretive) metapragmatic 
framing: spoke first in 3, saying in 5, flared up and almost screaming in 8, snarled in 10, said in 12, responded with 
shock, confusion, and silence in 15. The sequential format is constant, except that in B an interpretive phrase is 
appended at the end, and F provides a summary of the previous five episodes. But the content varies, showing 
different ways of restoring interpretability of the unexpected. It is these differences in content that I will try to 
describe, using the representational tool proposed in Table 1.  
 
1 
I walked around trying to 
give the ten-dollar bill away 
3 
About three of them, seeing 
the ten-dollar bill, spoke 
4 
“I’m sorry, I don’t have any 
change.” 
Table 2. Levels of analysis.
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Level I (1 to 17) is the phrase and sentence level. 
Level II (A to F) is an embedded interaction level, involving three types of ‘actor’:
– A1 = the person ‘offering’ the ten-dollar bill; 
– A2 = the people reacting; 
– A3 = the trainees following A1 and observing the interaction. 
Level III is the narrative level, with 
– an author A (who is identical to A1 at level II) 
– and readers R. 
Level IV is the (serious) story level, 
– also involving A and R,
– but also the actors in the background educational context: 
o the trainer T (who is identical to A1 at level II and A at level III) 
o and students S (who are identical to A3 at level II).
Let us look at the four levels of analysis one by one. At each level, there is a lot 
more to be analyzed, in terms of the calibration of explicit and implicit meaning, than 
what is immediately relevant in this context. Just look at sentence 1: I, a case of person 
deixis, is referentially indeterminate; walked around, a case of spatial deixis, is in itself 
equally indeterminate; trying implies an expectation of difficulty; to give away evokes a 
transactional frame or script involving an actor, an action, an object, and a beneficiary or 
target; the ten-dollar bill is a definite description carrying an existential presupposition, 
and dollar is underspecified with respect to the type of monetary system. All potential 
uncertainties (i.e. meanings left implicit) are, however, resolved (i.e. potentially brought to 
the surface of interpretational explicitness) for the reader given the available intratextual 
correspondences. Most of what there is to be analyzed at level I (the phrase and sentence 
level) is of this kind. Choices that are made at that level, however, make clear contributions 
to the effects scored at higher levels of structure.
Things that are immediately relevant for an understanding of the amusing nature of the 
story start happening at level II, which is the level of six embedded interactions (labelled 
A to F), which all have as their first pair part the ‘offer’ described in sentence 1, which 
is clearly conceived as an attempt to break expectations. In each case, the second pair 
part is linked to the first pair part by means of a form of (sometimes overtly interpretive) 
metapragmatic framing: spoke first in 3, saying in 5, flared up and almost screaming in 8, 
snarled in 10, said in 12, responded with shock, confusion, and silence in 15. The sequential 
format is constant, except that in B an interpretive phrase is appended at the end, and F 
provides a summary of the previous five episodes. But the content varies, showing different 
ways of restoring interpretability of the unexpected. It is these differences in content that I 
will try to describe, using the representational tool proposed in Table 1. 
Various types of meaning-generating mechanisms are represented in Table 3 (as in 
the following tables, 4 through 7, as well). The main challenge is to try and understand 
the way in which surface structure and meaning are linked to contextually anchored 
(‘indexed’) interpretations. In order to represent what happens in terms of contextual 
indexing, two questions need to be asked. 
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1
I walked around trying to give 
the ten-dollar bill away
3
About three of them, seeing the 
ten-dollar bill, spoke first
4
“I’m sorry, I don’t have any 
change.”
 ■
■                ■                          ■
                                ■
B
ackground fram
e 
(educational) – 
transparent only for 
A
1, A
3, A
, R
, T, S 
O
ffering m
oney 
(behavioral breach 
of expectations) 
M
etapragm
atic 
fram
ing – focus 
on im
m
ediacy of 
reaction
Im
plicit script: 
changing a ten-
dollar bill
N
on-com
pliance
Table 3. Embedded interaction A.
First of all, how salient is a given connection between a form of expression and its 
related contextual meaning? In other words, how much processing effort does it require 
to interpret? Or, since the experimental tools to measure salience in those terms are not 
readily available, what is the answer to the following rule-of-thumb question: how likely 
is it for a specific aspect of contextual, inferred meaning, to be questioned or challenged? 
Though responses to such a question remain intuitive, for now, the more likely the 
challenge, the closer the meaning will be to the surface (i.e., the more salient explicit it 
will be), the less likely the challenge, the ‘deeper’ (i.e. less salient, more implicit) it will 
be. It is the intuitive estimates in relation to these questions that determine placement of 
a dot (■) in a specific layer (at a specific ‘depth’) between surface forms and contextual 
meanings in the Table. In relation to sentence 1, for instance, the ‘offering’ of money is 
described quite literally, which is why the corresponding dot is in the upper layer (which 
still does not mean that all aspects of its meaning are totally explicit in that sentence – 
the breach of expectations which is involved depends interpretatively on the immediately 
preceding text), while the educational background frame does not only require reference 
to the preceding text but remains completely inaccessible to some of the participants (A2) 
in the interaction that is described (which is why the dot is far down, though with a link 
– to be explained later – with the surface ‘offering’). Similarly, in sentence 3 the focus 
on immediacy of reaction, inferable from the metapragmatic framing of the following 
utterance (sentence 4), is not entirely explicit; yet it does not require much processing 
effort to arrive at; hence placement in the second layer. In sentence 4, the money-changing 
script on which non-compliance with the offer is based, is close to the surface (even the 
word change comes in literally) but not entirely immune to challenge; hence placement 
relatively high up, but not all the way.
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A second question pertains to the relationships between the different elements of contextual 
indexing (represented by the dots). There are at least five relevant types of relationship:
(i) Simple sequentiality (represented in Table 3 by means of a simple full line); thus the ‘offer’ 
in 1 is followed by non-compliance in 3.
(ii) An overt textual link (a full line with an arrow head); thus the metapragmatic framing in 
3 bears on the utterance in 4.
(iii) An implicit conceptual link (dotted line with an arrow head); thus the educational back-
ground frame in 1 is needed to fully understand the ‘offering’ of money, and the implicit 
money-changing script in 4 provides the basis for non-compliance with the ‘offer.’
(iv) A contrast (double-arrowed dashed line); thus the money-offering script in 1 is incompa-
tible with the money-changing script in 4.
(v) Disconnection (not visually represented); thus the educational background frame, which is 
only accessible to A1, A3, A, R, T, and S, and which excludes A2, is entirely disconnected 
from the utterance in 4.
The overall picture is very similar for the other embedded interactions, as presented in 
Tables 4 through 7.
1
I walked around trying 
to give the ten-dollar bill 
away
5
Others hurried past 
saying
6
“I’m sorry, I don’t 
have any money on me 
right now,”
7
as though I had been 
trying to get money 
from them instead of 
trying to give them 
money
 ■         ■
  ■               ■                  ■
                               ■
                    ■ 
B
ackground fram
e
(educational) – 
transparent only for
A
1, A
3, A
, R
, T, S
O
ffering m
oney 
(behavioral breach of 
expectations
M
etapragm
atic fram
ing 
– focus on im
m
ediacy 
of reactions
Im
plicit script: begging
N
on-com
pliance
A
 expressing slight 
surprise
M
etapragm
atic fram
ing 
– explicit interpretation
Table 4. Embedded interaction B.
The only differences with A are that in 6 a different incompatible script is relied on as 
a basis for non-compliance with the offer in 1, and that further metapragmatic framing is 
added at the end (in 7) which explicitly reveals the incompatibility of the scripts; this further 
framing also suggests the author’s surprise at the script evoked in 6.
  
  
322 The pragmaTics of humor in a serious sTory
1
I walked around trying to give 
the ten-dollar bill away
8
One young woman flared up, 
almost screaming
9
“I’m not that kind of a girl, and 
if you don’t get away from here, 
I’ll call a cop!”
           ■
         ■           ■                                ■
       ■
                                 ■
B
ackground fram
e 
(educational) – 
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A
1, A
3, A
, R
, T, S
O
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oney (behavioral 
breach of expectations)
M
etapragm
atic fram
ing – 
focus on em
otionality of 
reaction
Threat 
Im
plicit script: prostitution
N
on-com
pliance
Table 5. Embedded interaction C.
Here the re-scripting in 9 underlies two actions rather than one: in addition to non-
compliance there is also a threat. The focus of the metapragmatic framing shifts accordingly.
1
I walked around trying to give 
the ten-dollar bill away
10
Another woman in her thirties 
snarled
11
“I don’t come that cheap!”
       ■
   ■                ■                            ■
                         ■
B
ackground fram
e 
(educational) – 
transparent only for
A
1, A
3, A
, R
, T, S
O
ffering m
oney (behavioral 
breach of expectations)
M
etapragm
atic fram
ing – 
focus on attitude
Im
plicit script: prostitution
N
on-com
pliance
Table 6. Embedded interaction D.
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Structurally, this exactly like Table 3, but the content of both the implicit script in 11 
and the metapragmatic framing in 10 differs. A slightly new picture we get in Table 7, not 
only with a new interpretive script and a different focus in the metapragmatic framing, but 
also with a different form of sequentiality (linking 14 to 12).
1
I walked around trying 
to give the ten-dollar bill 
away
12
There was one man 
who stopped and 
said, 
13
“What kind of a con 
game is this?”
14
and then walked 
away
         ■
 ■          ■                 ■            ■
                       ■
B
ackground fram
e 
(educational) – 
transparent only for
A
1, A
3, A
, R
, T, S
O
ffering m
oney 
(behavioral breach of 
expectations)
M
etapragm
atic fram
ing – 
focus on deliberateness of 
reaction
Im
plicit script: con gam
e
N
on-com
pliance
C
ontinuation of the focus 
on deliberateness
Table 7. Embedded interaction E.
The embedded interactions are concisely summarized in F in terms of an action-reaction 
framework, with 1 describing the action and 15 the expected reaction to the expectation-
breaching behavior of the author. In all those cases, the humorous or amusing effect seems to 
derive from the incongruity between the educational background frame on which the matter-
of-fact surface interpretation of the action described in 1 is based, and the reinterpretation 
underlying the reactions, prompted by the lack of access to the educational frame, the rare 
occurrence of people trying to give away money in the street, and hence the need to make 
sense of what is happening in terms of scripts that seem possible, if not plausible. 
At level III, then, we find the narrative frame, with an opening in 1 (describing the 
attempt to give away a ten-dollar bill) and a clear closing in 16 (describing the failure 
to do so). In terms of what is interesting for this paper, what is happening is all very 
straightforward, even if sentence 16 requires, for its interpretation, access to the embedded 
interactional episodes A to E and (less crucially) their summary in F.
 In contrast to the attempt-failure scenario in the narrative frame, the serious story level, 
level IV, has a goal-success structure. The introductory 0 (put between square brackets since 
it is not part of the text but rather my summary of the preceding text) provides an explicit 
sketch of the educational goal and the experiment set up to achieve it. After an intervening 
anticipatory summary of reactions to the opening move in 2, the end result, educational 
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success, is described in 17. While both 0 and 17 are (in terms of aspects of meaning relevant 
for this paper) quite explicit, 2 would be much further down on the scale of salience/
explicitness in a diagrammatic representation similar to the ones in the foregoing tables.
4. UNDERSTANDING HUMOR IN A SERIOUS STORY
There is bound to be an uneasy relationship between the foregoing description of aspects 
of meaning generation in a funny serious story, and some standard theories of humor, if for 
no other reason because the type of example deviates from what is commonly analyzed. The 
question we are still stuck with is, therefore: Why (and how) is this funny?
Among the standard concepts for explaining humor, there is the notion of incongruity. 
Simplifying a vast literature about this, the account goes as follows: a piece of discourse is 
produced which incorporates, to use Raskin’s (1985) terminology, (aspects of) two ‘scripts’ 
(frames of interpretation) which are (at least partly) in opposition with each other, i.e. which 
are incongruous. A humorous effect is then scored when the incongruity gets resolved. 
Typically this happens, for instance in a joke, at the end when it becomes clear that an 
initial interpretation in terms of one script must be replaced by interpretation in terms of 
the other script. 
Clearly, there is incongruity involved in our serious story. But this is the case at different 
levels. At level II, in each of the embedded interactions (A through E) there is an opposition 
between the explicit ‘offering money’ script which they all start out with and the more 
implicit script in terms of which actor A2 responds (from changing money and begging to 
prostitution and a con game). This is the incongruity represented by means of the double-
arrowed dashed lines in Tables 3 to 7. There is an even stronger incongruity at the interface 
between levels II and IV: A2’s interpretation scripts at level II are completely detached from 
the educational script at level IV which underlies the ‘offering money’ script; hence there 
is no connecting line at all in Tables 3 to 7. But in neither case is there any incongruity 
resolution in the sense that there would be a joke-like abrupt transition from interpretation 
in terms of one script to interpretation in terms of another. What makes the interactional 
events at level II funny is the fact that A1 and A3 expect a form of re-scripting on the part 
of A2, without being able to predict what shape it will take. Similarly, R at levels III and IV 
is led to expect A2’s re-scripting and will normally react with a healthy degree of surprise 
at the specific shapes the different responses take.6 The term ‘incongruity resolution’, then, 
can only be used here if it is also made applicable to an ‘understanding’ of the unpredictable 
specific shape of an expected type of incongruity. Such ‘resolution’ is there for all actors 
involved (A1, A3, A, R, T, S) except A2. What is happening is not meant to be funny for 
A2, because the incongruity is not meant to be recognized by him or her.
Another common notion to explain humor is to categorize it, like lying, as a type of non-
bona-fide modes of communication. Again simplifying the literature a bit, the distinguishing 
criterion to recognize bona-fide vs. non-bona-fide communication is that the former adheres 
to the Gricean maxims of conversation whereas the latter does not. In particular, humor 
would often involve attempts to mislead, to ‘prime’ in the wrong direction, up to a point. 
6 Here a link can be made with Giora’s (1991) emphasis on the element of surprise to explain jokes. We must 
remember, though, that the story we are analyzing can in no way be categorized as a joke.
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Clearly, our funny serious story does not fit that characterization at all. At level II, there 
is no attempt at all to mislead, even if background motivations for offering money remain 
hidden: A2 is free to accept the money. Not having access to A1’s context of the educational 
experiment, A3 remains at his/her primary context level where giving away a ten-dollar 
billing to people one does not know is unexpected deviant behavior which, therefore, must 
be given extra non-surface meaning.7 At the higher levels of analysis, III and IV, which is 
where the humorous effects are scored, this is a straightforward narrative which honors 
Grice as well as any narrative can.
Summarizing, the closest we may come to explaining why the story is funny is to point 
at the unpredictability of the specific manifestations of an expected form of incongruity.
5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Having tried to explain why Alinsky’s story is funny, and having shown some of the 
meaning-making mechanisms that are involved, we may still have to explain why the story 
is less funny than a corresponding candid-camera episode. After all, while being amused, 
one does not get a laughing fit when reading it. Probably this is due to the degree of 
explicitness with which the educational framing is provided. Another remaining question is, 
then, whether the same educational effect could be reached without at least telling or asking, 
if not doing, something that would break expectations. Probably not, so that a certain type 
or degree of humor would seem essential to an achievement of the serious goal. 
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